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A Introduction 
 
Do exceptional situations make exceptional good or exceptionally bad law? This is an 
old question often asked anew – especially in the context of the post-2008 economic 
crises travails of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The legal 
disputes which resulted from differing opinions about how to solve the crises and also 
how, incidentally, to improve the EMU’s governance have reached the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU). The most prominent case to date is the so called 
Gauweiler case, a preliminary reference procedure initiated by the German Constitutional 
Court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG).1 
 
Gauweiler concerns the legality of the decision of the Governing Board of the European 
Central Bank (ECB) of September 2012 on so called ‘Outright Monetary Transactions’ 
(OMT). This case is significant for legal integration in the EU since, although this case is 
the first which the German BVerfG has ever referred to the CJEU in a preliminary 
reference procedure (Article 267 TFEU), the reference by the BVerfG was formulated in 
very terse words.2 Essentially, the reference asks for clarification about the legality of the 
ECB’s OMT decision. But that reference is not formulated in terms of a dialogue 
between Courts, each respecting the other’s distinctive powers. Instead, the BVerfG 
explains why it considers the ECB’s decision to be ultra vires of its mandate and askes the 
CJEU essentially to confirm this interpretation warning about potential consequences in 
its assessment about the ‘constitutional identity’ of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Inherent is a thinly veiled threat to not accept the exclusive competence of the CJEU to 
review the legality of EU law and, instead, to unilaterally hold an act of an EU institution 
to be invalid within a Member State of the EU. The BVerfG reinforced its sceptical 
position of the primacy of EU law over the law of Member States by recalling in its 
decision for preliminary reference its case-law concerning the limits it perceives are set 
                               
1 Case C-62/14 Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag (OMT) of 16 June 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400.  
2 Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Germany) lodged on 10 February 2014 – Peter Gauweiler and 
Others, BVerfG, 2 BvR 1390/12 of 17.12.2013, http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20131217_2bvr139012.html. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2621933 
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for the Federal Republic of Germany’s integration in the European Union. In its 
decision, it refers to and further interprets the scope of its own case-law making 
reference inter alia to its judgments concerning the Treaty of Maastricht,3 the Treaty of 
Lisbon4 and in Honeywell,5 as precedent for its questions to the CJEU. 
 
This approach to formulating the preliminary ruling, a legal obligation for any court of a 
Member State of the EU ‘against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under 
national law’ (Article 267 para 3 TFEU) can therefore not be seen as a long overdue 
normalisation of the relations between the CJEU and the BVerfG. The BVerfG as one 
of the last remaining constitutional courts of Member States instead of simply complying 
with its clearly defined obligations under the Treaties to submit in adequate cases 
questions for preliminary reference. Rather, it is formulated as ‘last warning’ by the 
BVerfG after which, if the CJEU does not fall in line with its approach, it would 
consider to radically challenge the constitutional order of the EU and, in effect, 
questioning the Union’s very existence as a constitutional order. 
 
This is a remarkable effect of what might be, in the cold light of day, regarded as a 
dispute which in its essence arises from a nearly hypothetical question essentially of 
administrative-law nature of action of an independent agency – albeit admittedly, an 
agency created by the constitutional order and action which may have significant 
financial implications for the budgets of the underwriting Member States. Although the 
Treaties are being considered as its ‘constitutional charter’ – the TEU, TFEU and the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union - in parts contain law which in 
earlier days was referred to as truly a constitutional ‘traité cadre’ and in parts contains 
detailed provisions, normally found in legislative acts, sometimes referred to as 
provisions of ‘traité loi’. The question of the development and limits of the ECB’s 
monetary policy are developed in the context of traité loi: The ECB is designed as a 
highly independent EU agency with a legal basis and detailed Statutes on the level of the 
Treaties. The provisions not only circumscribe the objectives of monetary policy but 
also the instruments to great detail. They also confer normative powers as well as powers 
to enter into contractual relations. 
 
Against the background of this conflict, this paper does not focus predominantly on the, 
no doubt, eminently important questions of the constitutional relation between EU law 
and the law of the Member States. Nor does it address primarily the conceptual 
discussions of the past years, notably how to best frame the pluralism of legal orders in 
                               
3 BVerfGE, 89, 155 of 12 October 1993. 
4 BVerfGE, 123, 267 of 30 June 2009. 
5 2 BvR 2661/06 of 6 July 2010. 
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the EU – or how much hierarchic elements are necessary in this relation between legal 
orders in order to maintain a Union under the rule of law. Instead, this contribution 
focusses on the question what general lessons the Gauweiler case will teach for the 
development of public law in Europe. The reason for this question is that the setting of 
the case between detailed provisions on a constitutional level and the essentially 
administrative nature of the activities in combination with nature of the contested 
decision of the ECB as an emergency measure raises a sufficient amount of questions 
important enough to be discussed in their own right. It allows disregarding for a 
moment the BVerfG’s judicial threats to breach the primacy of Union law over the 
essentially hypothetical consequences of a not yet finally developed and not yet 
implemented future bond purchasing policy of the ECB. This paper therefore essentially 
looks at what we can learn for EU public law from the OMT dispute leading to 
Gauweiler. Have the exceptional emergency acts of the ECB – the OMT decision – 
created through the subsequent judicial review anything of value for concepts of 
European public law, and, if so, which? 
 
B Background – the OMT dispute  
 
One of the European Union’s most ambitious policy projects to date is the “economic 
and monetary union whose currency is the euro” (EMU, Article 3(4) TEU). The EMU’s 
two polices – the economic union and the monetary union - are an unequal set of twins. 
On one hand, the monetary union’s central elements are developed to great detail in the 
Treaties. They provide not only for provisions containing the introduction of the Euro 
as a single currency; but also institutionally, for the creation of the European System of 
Central Banks (ESCB) with the European Central Bank (ECB) on the EU level as a 
highly independent body equipped with the power to adopt specific forms of act. 
Additionally, the Treaty is specific about policy goals and principles of monetary policy.  
 
The economic union, on the other hand, is much less developed on the Union level. The 
original approach in the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992 was to leave economic – and fiscal 
- policies largely within the competence of the Member States with the establishment of 
only loose mechanisms of intergovernmental cooperation. Market pressures, so the 
original thinking behind the loose structure, would in the long run ensure that national 
policy choices by the elected parliaments and governments on the Member State levels 
and align them with each other to form a coherent whole.6 
                               
6 One possible explanation for the distinction between the monetary and the economic policy in the Treaties is that it had originally been 
based on the assumption that the key to stable growth in the economy was ‘sound’ monetary policy conducted by technical experts in 
independent central banks (see e.g. Peter A. Hall, The Mythology of European Monetary Union, 18 Swiss Political Science Review (2012), 508-
513 at 508). Active fiscal policy, was deemed counterproductive and it would have appeared inopportune to give the monetary union 
capacities for coordinating its member states’ fiscal policies (see e.g. Tal Sadeh, Amy Verdun, Explaining Europe’s Monetary Union: A 
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In view of this situation, a key challenge for a unified monetary policy in the EU has 
been the resulting potential mismatches of policy approaches in these two highly 
interrelated policy fields.7 Irrespective of the very different treatment of the monetary 
and economic policies in the EMU, the two are highly inter-related. Monetary policy, 
largely set by the ECB and implemented by the ESCB, takes place alongside of and in 
coordination with fiscal policy measures, which typically include taxation or debt-
financing of public budgets and the allocation of available funds in national budgets and 
social security systems. The broader economic policy orientation of Member States also 
includes issues of regulation, for example, through labour law, competition law or energy 
law. Monetary policy is created by reacting to and commenting on economic policy 
decisions of Member States. Therefore, the ECB, as a highly specialised European body, 
may risk overstepping into matters of economic policy. Drawing the boundaries is not 
easy. In exercising its task of designing the correct monetary policy for the Eurozone, 
the ECB cannot ignore the structure and the state of the economy. In fact, it might have 
more information about the reality of the economic situation than many Member State 
governments.  
 
The contested OMT decision of the ECB was taken in a time of particular market 
unrest. Doubts about the future of the EMU were rampant. The cost of borrowing 
money on the markets rose sharply for some Member States of the EU, in some 
instances, arguably, rather independently of the underlying creditworthiness of the public 
treasuries trying to sell its government bonds. At that time, the president of the ECB, 
Mario Draghi, made a widely cited speech stating that within its mandate, “the ECB is 
ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro.” To this he added: “And believe me, 
it will be enough.”8  
 
One month later, at a press conference after a meeting of the ECB’s Governing Council 
of 6 September 2012, the president of the ECB announced to the public the decision to 
conduct the OMT-programme and gave some details. Essentially the ECB announced 
that it would develop a programme the legal details were yet to be decided by legal 
instruments. In its statement, the ECB declared that it was ready to purchase on 
secondary markets government bonds issued by States of the euro area, subject to 
                                                                                                      
Survey of the Literature, 11 International Studies Review (2009), 277-301 at 285 with further references). The fact that this distinction allowed 
for the creation of a monetary union without the necessity of the transfer of a wide range of fiscal and general economic policy powers to 
the EU might help explain the striking differences in structure between the monetary and the economic union within the EMU. 
7 The objectives and administrative tasks of the economic and monetary union (Article 3(4) TEU) are outlined in Article 119 TFEU 
according to which the activities of the Member States and the Union under monetary policy include “the adoption of an economic policy 
which is based on the close coordination of Member States' economic policies, on the internal market and on the definition of common 
objectives, and conducted in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition” and creating and 
administering “a single currency, the euro, and the definition and conduct of a single monetary policy and exchange-rate policy (…).” 
8 Speech by Mario Draghi, President of the ECB at the Global Investment Conference in London, 26 July 2012, 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html. 
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certain conditions which included that, first, states concerned had to be subject to 
financial assistance by either the European Financial Stability Facility (“EFSF”)9 or the 
European Stability Mechanism (“ESM”),10 two structures put into place by Member 
States in the context of the European economic policy to stabilise States in financial 
difficulties. Second, no quantitative limits for the amount of purchases of these 
government bonds were announced. Third, the ECB would act in the same way as any 
private creditors and therefore not benefit from a special status as public actor. Finally, 
the ECB announced that any liquidity so created would be fully ‘sterilised’, indicating 
that the ECB wished to avoid the creation of additional money in circulation. 
 
This announcement sufficed to reduce the in view of the ECB extreme spreads and the 
high volatility of the interest rates charged for government bonds of various States using 
the Euro which had not been based on macroeconomic differences between the States 
but were based on speculation as to the breaking up of the Eurozone. The 
announcement was never followed up by any binding ECB legal instruments or 
decisions to put the OMT programme in place and was consequently never 
implemented. The ECB did however, formally unrelated to the actual OMT programme, 
begin in March 2015 a landmark €60 billion per month so called ‘quantitative easing’ 
programme in which it buys government bonds on the secondary markets. The mere 
announcement had however the power to calm the markets. Since 2012 there have been 
no more extreme spreads of the kind which led the ECB to make its announcement. 
 
Against this background, the dispute in Gauweiler arose. The BVerfG essentially asked 
the CJEU whether the ECB overstepped its powers which have been conferred on it in 
the Treaties relating primarily to monetary policy. Did the ECB act ultra vires in venturing 
into economic policy – a matter reserved in the EU’s federal structure to the Member 
States? 11  The BVerfG’s reference to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling raises the 
question, first, whether the OMT programme, rather than being a monetary policy 
measure under Article 18 ESCB Statute and Article 119 TFEU, is in fact an economic 
policy measure, which would fall outside the scope of the ECB’s mandate. Secondly, the 
German court is doubtful whether the measure complies with the prohibition of 
monetary financing of the Member States laid down in the provisions of the EU 
economic union in Article 123 TFEU. It is a familiar pattern to public law: Interesting 
constitutional questions arise from matters with an administrative background.  
                               
9 The European Financial Stability Facility, is a special purpose vehicle, outside the EU Law framework, established as a private company 
under Luxembourg law with the EU member states as shareholders. 
10 The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is the permanent crisis resolution mechanism for the countries of the euro area. The 
intergovernmental treaty under public international law establishing the ESM was adopted on 2 February 2012. 
11 Additionally, the BVerfG asks the question, whether the OMT decision, by allowing for the purchase of particular Euro member 
government bonds on the so called secondary market violates the prohibition of monetary financing of state debt laid down in Article 
123(1) TFEU. 
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questions. However, the underlying concern in the German debate voiced also by some 
of the plaintiffs in the original dispute before the BVerfG was that if the ECB were to 
move ahead with its bond-buying programme, this might risk exposing the ECB to such 
degree of obligations that ECB risked itself to go bankrupt. In this case, the Member 
States, being the ultimate shareholders of the ECB, would be held liable for the losses 
which in turn would affect the budgetary powers of the national parliaments.  
 
 
C Reviewing an announcement of a possible future policy 
programme 
 
Essentially, the ECB had announced a detailed plan to undertake future market 
interventions by means of entering into purchase agreements on the open markets of 
government bonds. This announcement is made in a dramatic moment with great 
market unrest. The ECB uses its status and credibility to declare an emergency measure 
to be imminent. But legally speaking, an obvious question normally consists of the fact 
whether such announcement, or the underlying decision to make such de facto 
announcement, can or should be subject to any judicial review. Does the fact that a 
measure is an emergency measure change anything in this respect? 
 
a) Review of Regulation by Information 
 
Generally, administrative action that is explicitly or implicitly designed to have factual, as 
opposed to legal, consequences or effects can be referred to as ‘factual conduct’ or 
‘factual act’ in order to distinguish them from formal, legally effective measures. 12 
Neither in the EU context nor in the context of national legal systems does factual 
conduct occur in a legal vacuum. Rules and principles of EU administrative law frame 
establishing both criteria for the legality cases of factual conduct and the consequences 
of the illegality. Normally the legality of any factual act undertaken by an EU institution 
would be open to review within the procedure for a preliminary ruling by the ECJ under 
Article 267 TFEU.13 That is the case in the BVerfG reference to the CJEU in Gauweiler. 
Unusual, but inherent in the system of legal review of the Court system in Europe which 
is separated by national and European levels, is that a national Court such as the 
German Constitutional Court, can by broadly interpreting its admissibility criteria 
achieve broad review by the CJEU of diverse categories of action of EU institutions and 
                               
12  Expressions found in the language of some of the legal systems of the Member State include acte juridique and fait materiel (French) 
and Realakt and schlichtes/informales Verwaltungshandeln (German). 
13  The latter, unlike Art. 230 EC (Art. 263 TFEU), allows for the review of any forms of acts by the institutions. Unlike Art. 230 EC 
(Art. 263 TFEU), does not require that acts intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties.  
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bodies. The CJEU principles has the obligation of answering questions submitted to it 
by a national court. It is recognised in EU law that a purely factual measure or other 
factual conduct, lacking in itself formal legal status or character, may amount to the 
implementation, at least implicitly or tacitly, of a decision.  
 
In  Gauweiler, however, it is necessary to try to assess the nature of the act. The ECB held 
a press conference announcing a decision by its Governing Board. That decision was to 
be aimed at taking future binding legal acts which were to determine to greater detail the 
specific circumstances of action. However, it is undisputed that after this announcement, 
few would have doubted that the ECB would consider doing so at short notice. Also, it 
is undisputed that the announcement was already fairly detailed as to the conditions the 
Governing Board of the ECB had set as criteria for future action. Yet, legally speaking, 
the only ‘act’ subject to review was the announcement itself. It would appear that the 
factual act arises here from the ECB issuing a public statement.  
 
Information policy being reviewed under conditions of factual conduct is not limited to 
monetary policy. Monetary policy is merely one example of public communication 
having become a key tool of regulation. ‘Regulation by information’ as it is generally 
known is a central element of public activities used in many policy areas. Within the EU, 
the European Commission applies this approach to further the goals of the Treaties. 
Publication within fields of Union competences can be either in the form of information 
of interested parties about decision-making criteria and practices or in the form of 
establishing performance benchmarks and reporting about Member States’ or other 
actors’ performance. In the context of monetary policy, the ECB, as European agency, 
has the explicit legal obligation to communicate widely and transparently. 
Communication is one of the respected tools of this field by which the ECB can 
influence markets in order to conduct its policies.  
 
All of this cannot, however, deter from the fact that the ECB announcement was a 
situation of mere factual conduct. In reviewing this, the CJEU confirms the criteria of 
legality for such acts. First, the criteria of legality must be the same as for other 
implementing actions of EU authorities. Thus, the institution or authority will need to 
be competent to act within the policy area and be authorised to using the form of 
measure concerned. In other words, the competence must extend not only to the 
question of how to act (that is, the means) but also to the question of whether to act (that 
is, the subject matter and purpose). A further significant test of legality relates to the 
limits upon the action to be taken. Specifically, the institution or body undertaking the 
factual measure, that is, engaging in the factual conduct, must respect and meet the 
standards of the general principles of law which generally govern the legality of Union 
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acts, such as the principles of proportionality and the protection of fundamental rights 
and others.14 In other words, the test of legality of factual conduct should not differ from 
that applicable to formal measures taken by the administration. In Gauweiler the CJEU 
explicitly confirms this approach as set of criteria for review of the announcement of the 
OMT programme by the ECB. It first reviews its legal basis and whether the ECB had 
acted ultra vires the powers conferred on it in its enabling law – the Treaties and the 
Statutes of the ESCB – before reviewing compliance with general principles of EU law 
such as, most importantly, the principle of proportionality.   
 
The CJEU’s confirmation in Gauweiler of the importance of regulating information and 
the confirmation of the criteria for review are an important clarification. Only due to the 
questions raised in the context of the preliminary reference from the BVerfG, does the 
CJEU acknowledge this approach. No direct actions for annulment under Article 263 
TFEU would have been admissible so that the Court might not have had opportunity to 
so clearly express its views on the criteria for legality and review.15  
 
 
b) Review of a general programme  
 
The CJEU’s Advocate General in the case, Cruz Villalón, had pointed out another 
specificity of the review question addressed to the CJEU: The question for him is how 
to conduct judicial review ‘where the impugned act is a measure outlining a general 
programme of action, intended to bind the actual authority which is the author of the 
decision.’ The question is, therefore, should there be any difference between review of 
such general but internal programme as opposed to review of ‘an act that contains a 
measure which creates rights and obligations with regard to third parties.’ Review of a 
programme should take place, according to the AG,16 since general action programmes 
of public authorities may be capable of having a very direct impact on the future legal 
situation of individuals. This, so the AG ‘justifies taking a non-formalistic approach” 
when considering whether it should reviewed.’ ‘Otherwise, there would be a risk that an 
institution could undermine the system of acts and the corresponding judicial safeguards 
by disguising acts that are intended to produce external effects as general programmes.’17 
The CJEU implicitly follows implicitly this line. It submits the announcement of the 
OMT programme to the same criteria for judicial review as any other factual act it comes 
                               
14  
15 Case C-62/14 Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag (OMT) of 16 June 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, paras 32-126. 
16 Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón of 14 January 2015 in Case C-62/14 Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag (OMT), 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, paras 75. 76. 
17 Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón of 14 January 2015 in Case C-62/14 Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag (OMT), 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, paras 75. 76. 
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to review. In fact, it can rely on a long tradition of case law doing so reaching back over 
forty years. In ERTA the CJEU reviewed a Council position paper coordinating 
Member States in the negotiations for the conclusion of an international agreement 
which was subject to judicial review, because it was capable of ‘derogating … from the 
procedure laid down by the Treaty’.18  
 
The CJEU does not enter into this debate simply approaching the question of review of 
the programme as it would do with any other factual act, the legal nature is not entirely 
clear. It can leave this question open in this specific situation of litigation, because the 
question presented to it comes from a national Court which does not appear to have any 
difficulties working with the nature of the plan. The BVerfG, as the CJEU points out, 
appears to regard the ECB announcement, because of the details given in the press 
declaration about the future programme, to be sufficiently precise in order to be able to 
review its legality. This approach is, it should be mentioned, entirely consistent with the 
CJEU’s approach in its review under Article 318(11) TFEU of future international 
agreements. That article specifically speaks of “agreements envisaged”, a term 
interpreted by the CJEU interprets broadly requesting only the subject matter of the 
agreement to be known.19 Even before negotiations have started and a specific text being 
presented, the specific procedure is admissible, according to the Court as long as it has 
sufficient information about the content and the basic structural elements of the plan for 
the envisaged agreement.20  
 
D Full review of compliance with the legal basis and its limitations 
 
According to the above, the judicial review of the announcement of the OMT 
programme by the ECB then follows the two-tier approach of looking at first, whether 
the programme has a legal basis and whether it violates any legal norms its powers are 
subject to. Second, the Court reviews whether the measure complies with general 
principles of EU law, notably the principle of proportionality to which any act of an EU 
body is subject to. The review of proportionality is the moment where the real question 
of the degree of review of the discretionary powers of a highly independent agency will 
be asked. 
 
a) Does the ECB have a legal basis? 
 
                               
18 Case 22/70 ERTA, EU:C:1971:32, para 54. 
19 See e.g. Opinion 1/78 international agreement on natural rubber [1979] ECR 2871, paras 32-34. 
20 See e.g. Opinion 1/94  Accession by the Communities to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [1996] ECR I-
1759, paras 11-12.  
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Review of any act of an EU body, be it legislative or administrative in nature is subject to 
full review as to compliance with the legal basis. This is a question of what the Court 
calls ‘objective criteria’. The degree to which the legal system has regulated a matter by 
higher ranking law may vary. In case of the ECB, an EU agency which has been created 
by Treaty provisions and which is regulated to a high degree by what can be referred to 
as ‘traité-loi’. Therefore, in tune with the degree of detail of the legal framework of the 
matter, judicial review of such activity can be equally detailed. In interpreting legal basis, 
a method of interpretation of borrowed from public international law which looks for 
the teleological intention to ensure the effet utile (effectiveness) of the measure.  
 
In that sense, the CJEU starts with an analysis of the legal framework and the objectives 
of monetary policy. It focusses specifically on the fact that monetary policy of the Union 
under Article 119(2) TFEU must ensure a ‘single currency, the euro, and the definition 
and conduct of a single monetary policy and exchange-rate policy’ 21  Therefore any 
monetary policy must be oriented towards a ‘single policy’ for the Union. 
 
The legal framework for action of the ECB to work towards this task is regulated in the 
chapter on monetary policy of the TFEU as well as in the Statutes of the ESCB, 
annexed to the Treaties as protocol No 4, which grants the Statutes the same legal value 
as the Treaties themselves. The ECB’s mandate is quite precisely defined in the TFEU, 
which in its Article 127 states that its “the primary objective” “is to maintain price 
stability” (emphasis added). However, Article 127 TFEU also explicitly states that without 
prejudice to this objective, monetary policy shall support the ‘general economic policies 
in the Union... .’ With this mandate, a fundamentally political powers has been conferred 
on a very independent administrative body, the ECB. The ECB is designed to 
concentrate a maximum amount of expertise. Article 282(4) TFEU establishing that the 
ECB ‘shall adopt such measures as are necessary to carry out its tasks.’  Its ‘monetary 
functions’ are specified in Articles 18-20 of the ESCB Statutes.  
 
Technically, the OMT programme therefore fell under the powers granted to the ECB 
under Article 18 of the ESCB Statutes under which the ECB may conduct so called 
‘open market and credit operations’. ‘Open market’ activities are contractual activities 
which include buying and selling as well as lending or borrowing ‘claims and marketable 
instruments’ as well as conducting ‘credit operations with credit institutions and other 
market participants, with lending being based on adequate collateral.” Importantly, 
under Article 18 of the ESCB Statutes, the ECB is obliged to conduct an information 
                               
21 Both of which is to be undertaken with the primary objective ‘to maintain price stability and, without prejudice to this objective, to 
support the general economic policies in the Union, in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition’. 
Article 119(2) TFEU. 
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policy by establishing also a policy “for the announcement of conditions under which 
they stand ready to enter into such transactions.” 
 
In this context, European monetary law contains many familiar features but is also 
characterized by certain specificities when compared with other areas of European 
administrative law. Monetary policy for the EU is conducted by the European Central 
Bank (ECB) in conjunction with the NCBs of the EU Member States which have joined 
the Eurozone.22 The ECB is in some ways structured similarly to an EU agency with a 
legal basis in the Treaties.23 Similar to many agencies, the ECB is a centre of Union 
expertise. Monetary policy is an area that requires great technical expertise to manage 
and entails large and substantive risks for the economic wellbeing of all citizens and for 
the financial positions of the Member States. For that reason, it is an eminently political 
area of law.24 The ECB’s organs are the Governing Council and an Executive Board.25  
 
Within the ECB, the ECB’s Governing Council has the central tasks of formulating the 
monetary policy of the Union by adopting the guidelines and takes the decisions 
‘necessary to ensure the performance of the tasks entrusted to the ESCB under these 
Treaties and this Statute’. This includes, under Article 12(1) Statutes ESCB, decisions 
relating to ‘intermediate monetary objectives, key interest rates and the supply of 
reserves in the ESCB’.  
 
By contrast, very few legal provisions had been put in place to implement the economic 
policy within the European ‘economic and monetary union’ prior to the onset of the 
economic crises in 2008. The Treaty of Maastricht had left incomplete a possible 
economic policy union despite the “the monetary and economic union” (Article 3 TEU) 
containing “two integral parts of a single whole” which would have to be implemented 
in parallel.26 Much of the field of economic policy cooperation was developed ad hoc in 
response to the economic crises since 2008. The central legal norm has been Article 126 
                               
22  As of 2015 the following 18 Member States who had adopted the Euro as their currency: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain. 
23 The ECB evolved out of the European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF) which had been set up by Council Regulation (EEC) No 
907/73 of 3 April 1973 (OJ 1973 L 89/2). The EMCF was superseded and its functions assumed by the European Monetary Institute 
(EMI). This was a temporary body created at the beginning of stage two of the EMU (Article 109f TEC and the EMI statutes attached as 
a protocol to the TEC).   
24 However there are some important differences between the ECB and the organization of other Union agencies. The relevant Treaty 
provisions regulate to great detail the internal structure and the independence of the ECB. The ESCB under Article 130 TFEU and the 
ECB according to its statutes a strictly independent. Under Article 130 TFEU “neither the ECB, nor a national central bank, nor any 
member of their decision making bodies shall seek or take instructions from Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, from any 
government of a Member State.” 
25 Under Article 283 TFEU the ECB’s Governing Council comprises the members of the executive board of the ECB and the Governors 
of the NCBs of the Eurozone states. The NCBs are thereby not represented as institutions but by individuals acting in their capacity as 
members of an ECB organ. Each member of the Governing Council has one vote exercised in confidential proceedings. But voting rights 
are not allocated on a one-Member-State-one-vote basis. The number of governors with voting rights is limited to 15. 
26 Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union, Report on economic and monetary union in the European Community, 
(Brussels 1989). 
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TFEU on the prohibition of excessive government deficits. However, these basic 
provisions have been expanded with structures, some of which seemed to be testing 
notions of constitutionality via the creative use of existing forms of act. Great creativity 
was employed to set up structures capable of achieving the objectives amid a divided 
Union with countries having adopted the Euro and countries not having done so. In 
essence, with regard to the ECB, the key norm to the dispute is the essential limitation 
of ECB monetary policies regarding the economic policy decisions. In it, the 
competences of the ECB are strictly circumscribed by the prohibition of monetary 
financing of Member State debt by means of direct purchases as opposed to open 
market operations of the ECB involving Member State bonds (Article 123(1) TFEU). 
 
In Gauweiler the Court finds that in that context, the ECB had the right to design a 
programme safeguarding its possibilities to ensure that its monetary policy would be 
capable of contributing to price stability in a single currency area. It accepts the technical 
evaluations of the ECB that at the moment of the publication of its announcement, 
interest rates charged for government bonds by different member states had been 
distorted by speculation about their exit from the Eurozone, and therefore threatening 
the policy objective of a ‘single’ currency. ‘Since disruption of the transmission 
mechanism undermines the effectiveness of the measures adopted by the ESCB, that 
necessarily affects the ESCB’s ability to guarantee price stability. Accordingly, measures 
that are intended to preserve that transmission mechanism may be regarded as pertaining 
the primary objective laid down in Article 127(1) TFEU.’27 The CJEU, in its objective 
review of whether a measure is within the legal basis, nonetheless, has to accept that the 
expertise of the institution developing a measure must be recognised and that its 
scientific evaluation of a situation should be respected. Interestingly, the claim made by 
the ECB that that was so is regarded to be sufficient by the CJEU. The Advocate 
General spells out quite clearly that the fact, ex post facto, that the Eurozone did not break 
apart and that the conditions for conducting a single monetary policy was restored is 
sufficient in the context of this review.28 It would appear, however, in principle that a 
much clearer relation between criteria of full review, scientific expertise and discretion in 
its evaluation would need to be established in order to ensure a more convincing level or 
review.  
 
The delimitation of monetary policy – conferred on the ESCB – and economic policy – 
which remains largely with the Member States and the Union legislator – is viewed by he 
CJEU in Gauweiler as a question of primary versus secondary effects of a measure. In 
                               
27 Case C-62/14 Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag (OMT) of 16 June 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, paras 46-49. 
28 Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón of 14 January 2015 in Case C-62/14 Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag (OMT), 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, para 84. 
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reality, the distinction mirrors older case law of the CJEU on the so called ‘centre of 
gravity’ rule which was applied in situations where a measure could have several 
competing legal basis each proposing a different decision making procedure. The Court 
informs that the fact that a measure in the field of the Union’s monetary policy might 
incidentally also have secondary effects ‘on the stability of the euro area’, which is a 
matter of economic policy, does not call that assessment into question.’29 
 
This is, according to the Court not challenged by the conditionality of the announced 
bond buying activities of the ECB on compliance of a target country’s compliance with 
the conditions of EFSM and ESM macroeconomic adjustment programmes. The 
background to this is the following: In reaction to the realities of the lack of common 
economic policy and in the wake of the economic crises since 2008, the EU had to find 
ways to deal with various emergency situations. Thus between late 2010 and 2012, a 
comprehensive reinforcement of economic governance in the EU and the euro area was 
set in place establishing institutional structures such as the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM),30 the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM)31 and the 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF)32 as agreements under public international 
law outside the Treaty framework. Using public international law was not uncontested 
but had become necessary by the lack of unanimity in Council. In Pringle the CJEU 
declared this approach legal, 33  but the negative consequence is that the 
intergovernmental approach excludes making use of democratic accountability existing 
within the Union. 34  The CJEU finds that the discretionary decision by the ECB to 
request this conditionality is in itself proof of its independence. It is in compliance with 
the obligations of Article 127(1) TFEU to do nothing that would be able to dis-
encourage Member States to maintain sound finances.35 One might argue otherwise.  
 
                               
29 Case C-62/14 Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag (OMT) of 16 June 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, para 51, with reference to C-
370/12 Pringle EU:C:2012:756, para 56. 
30 The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is the permanent crisis resolution mechanism for the countries of the euro area. The 
intergovernmental treaty establishing the ESM was adopted on 2 February 2012. 
31 The European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism, legally based in Art. 122 (2) TFEU, is a programme whose purpose is to provide 
loans to EU Member States in financial difficulty. 
32 The European Financial Stability Facility, is a special purpose vehicle, outside the EU Law framework, established as a private company 
under Luxembourg law with the Member States as shareholders. 
33 Case C-370/12 Pringle EU:C:2012:756; with much literature having discussed the legality of the structure. See e.g. See for instance, 
Mathias Ruffert, ‘The European Debt Crisis and European Union Law’ (2011) 48 C.M.L. Rev. 1777,1785; Richard Palmstorfer, ‘To bail 
out or not to bail out? The current framework of financial assistance for euro area Member States measured against the requirements of 
EU primary law’ (2012) 37 E.L. Rev., 771-784;  Jean-Victor Louis, ‘The no-bailout clause and rescue packages’ (2010) 47 C.M.L.Rev. 971, 
977; Jörn Pipkorn, ‘Legal arrangements in the Treaty of Maastricht for the effectiveness of the economic and monetary union’ (1994) 31 
C.M.L.Rev. 275; Harald Hofmeister ‘To Bail Out Or Not to Bail Out?—Legal Aspects of the Greek Crisis’, (2010-2011) 13 Cambridge 
Yearbook of European Legal Studies, 113 – 134. 
34 The chosen approach thus considerably strengthened the executive branch of powers of the Member States. One example is the 
creation and empowerment in matters of fiscal and economic policies of the ‘Eurogroup’, a gathering of national ministers of finance. 
Another effect of this approach is that the ECB was involved, due to its unmatched expertise in monetary policy matters, in the drafting 
of the conditions of the assistance granted to Member States by the EFSM and the ESM. 
35 Case C-62/14 Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag (OMT) of 16 June 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, paras 58-60. 
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As the AG has pointed out, the ECB is therefore not neutral in the formulation of the 
criteria of economic policy of the Member States which are in assistance programmes of 
the EFSM and the ESM. The ECB would thus, when creating the condition for 
government bond purchase programmes, in effect, reinforce the incentives to comply 
with these conditions.36 In that sense, the Court is in a catch 22 situation. Should it find 
that the OMT programme is not actually a combined monetary and economic policy 
measure? The Court takes this combination as a sign that the ECB complies with the 
economic policy prerogatives of the Member States but the close knit interaction of the 
various players is exactly the problem which arises from expert agencies being called 
upon to advise on specific policies and then to implement them including to designing 
general implementing schemes. Independent agencies become truly powerful through 
their exclusive mastery of complex factual situations.  
 
b) Does the ECB comply with the limitations of its mandate? 
 
As indicated, the scope of the ECB’s powers in monetary policy matters is particularly 
narrowly defined in EU constitutional provisions of the Treaties. The competences of 
the ECB are for example circumscribed by the prohibition of monetary financing of 
Member State debt by means of direct purchases (as opposed to open market operations 
of the ECB involving Member State bonds - Article 123(1) TFEU). This prohibition 
relates to the original concept of creating the European economic and monetary union 
by means of a centralised monetary policy in combination with a loose cooperation of 
economic policies. The original pre-crises construct was hoping for the disciplining 
effect of the financial markets to incite Member States to take sound financial decisions 
This was supposed to imply a ‘competitive’ and ‘decentralized’ model of the macro-
economic European Constitution.37 Such a ‘market-based system’ is premised on the fact 
that states’ in principle should have direct access to financial markets in order to finance 
their debts. Fiscal indiscipline and unsound public finances would be punished, the 
market-based model argues, directly through the markets which would stop the lending 
to the non-compliant state. In this vein, 125 TFEU38 establishes a ‘no bail-out clause’ in 
                               
36 Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón of 14 January 2015 in Case C-62/14 Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag (OMT), 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, para 156. 
37 Miguel Poiares Maduro, We the Court, (Hart Publishing 1998), p. 103 et seq. 
38 Article 125 (1) TFEU reads as: “The Union shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local 
or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of any Member State, without prejudice to mutual 
financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project. A Member State shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of 
central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of another 
Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project”. 
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combination with a strict prohibition on ‘monetising’ debt through the ECB in Article 
123 TFEU.39  
 
Again, the review of compliance with the limitations of the independence of the ECB 
and compatibility of its actions with Article 123 TFEU is subject to full review of the 
CJEU. Therefore, the CJEU interprets Article 123 TFEU in combination with Article 
18.1. of the ESCB Statutes and finds that the ECB may on the financial markets buy and 
sell outright marketable instruments which include government bonds. This established, 
the question remains about compliance with these terms, and their possible 
circumvention.  
 
Although part of the ESCB mandate is transparent communication, the irony of this is 
that, although the ECB is required to inform transparently about its activities and the 
announcement of the OMT programme falls within this point, the CJEU has to accept 
that the ECB can only fulfil the requirements it establishes, if it leaves market 
participants uncertain about when and how much debt it would buy on the secondary 
market and how long it would hold the government bonds once purchased, i.e. whether 
it would resell these bonds or whether it would hold them to maturity.  
 
E Review of the discretionary powers of the ECB 
 
It would appear that the matters of full review discussed above leave some room for 
assessment to an EU agency as the ECB. Even in full review, the CJEU has deferred to 
assessments of factual situations such as the risk for breaking apart of the Eurozone. 
However, apart from the assessment of the facts leading to the decisions taken by the 
ECB, the decisions as such are discretionary. It is a situation of deference to the 
assessment of the input into a decision by an agency and granting of discretion regarding 
the outcome.  
 
The CJEU accepts that large quantities of statistical information and economic expertise 
are needed for monetary policy making. The broad legal definition of the ECB’s tasks, 
combined with a constitutionally guaranteed independence of the ECB, this results in 
very broad discretion of the ECB to decide upon the use of such datea for monetary 
policy decisions. To exercise this task it has, as AG Cruz Villanón observes in Gauweiler, 
at its disposal technical expertise and access to crucial information which allows it to 
                               
39 Article 125 (1) TFEU reads as: “The Union shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local 
or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of any Member State, without prejudice to mutual 
financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project. A Member State shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of 
central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of another 
Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project”. 
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devise monetary policies actually influence economic realities. 40  This type of highly 
technical, very complex and information intensive activity is, consequently, very difficult 
to monitor through ‘traditional’ legal means of a framework of powers and judicial 
review.  
 
Criteria of accountability are ones are generally applicable in cases of broad discretion. 
The fewer the possibilities of judicial review as to the substance of the decision of the 
administration, the more important are procedural considerations as to, for example, 
compliance with the duty of care (full and independent assessment of all relevant facts 
prior to decision-making), compliance with the requirement of reasoning of a measure. 
This in the case law of the CJEU is generally wrapped up in an in-depth review of 
proportionality. 
 
Gauweiler is a case confirming and reinforcing an existing trend in the EU. Broad 
discretion conferred on an institution or body will not deter from detailed review under 
proportionality criteria. The key to this development is, like in many systems, a 
proceduralisation of review criteria. Compliance with procedural obligations under the 
principle of proportionality imposes an obligation on Union bodies ‘at least to satisfy 
themselves that the proposed measures are prima facie adequate to attain the legitimate 
aims pursued.’41 These questions are linked to the control over the exercise of discretion 
in judicial review. So far, the review of single case decisions has taken place in the 
context of the control of the duty of diligent and impartial examination of all aspects of 
the case. This is closely linked to the obligation to give reasons. Only a sufficiently 
reasoned decision will indicate compliance with the duty of care and the standards of 
investigation. Especially in highly fact-based and context determined competition law 
cases, the GC has limited the obligation of providing reasons for the final decision from 
the perspective of the satisfaction of the duty of care or diligence. In stating the reasons 
for decisions, the Commission is not obliged to adopt a position on all the arguments 
put forward by the parties, but may concentrate its presentation of facts and legal 
considerations to those having decisive importance for the decision. In a range of 
situations it will not be sufficient for administrative decision-makers to rely on pre-
existing knowledge within the authority or on information provided by the parties. 
Instead, they must have recourse to scientific expertise. The necessity of gathering the 
latter can be the reason for creating an expert agency and equipping it with specific 
powers such as the ECB. 
 
                               
40 See: Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón in C-62/14 Peter Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag of 14 January 2015.  
41 Opinion of Sharpston AG in Case C-310/04 Spain v Council [2006] ECR I-7285 at para 80. The violation of the duty to care by the 
institutions was so severe that they were criticized as appearing arbitrary: “In the absence of any impact study, certain choices made by the 
Commission and the Council appear arbitrary” (para 94). 
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On the basis to deference to the factual assessment of the ECB and its explanations 
given in and around the press conference leading to the announcement of the OMT 
programme, the CJEU there finds that under the first leg of the proportionality test, the 
ECB could reasonably have taken the view that the OMT programme was appropriate 
to achieve the objectives outlined in the Treaty of conducting a single currency, 
maintaining price stability in the entire Eurozone and without prejudice to the former 
also supporting the general economic policies of the Union. 42  However, this was 
undertaken in the context of an emergency measure which presumably would reduce the 
requirements of documentation and increase the margin of appreciation of facts granted 
to the institution.  
 
The acceptance of the technical expertise and forecasts based on complex assessments 
by the court in that context must be generally supported by an ‘adequate statement of 
the reasons for its decision’. In this context, of course, the fact that the OMT 
programme is merely announced at a press conference but still non-existent from a legal 
point of view, does not allow it to have a statement of reasons.  
 
The Court plays over this problem by stating that ‘ the press release, together with draft 
legal acts considered during the meeting of the Governing Council [of the ECB] at 
which the press release was approved, make known the essential elements of a 
programme such as that announced in the press release and are as such as to enable the 
Court to exercise its judicial review.’43 Any future plaintiff being rejected because of the 
inadmissibility of the case because of the preparatory nature of a measure does not 
qualify as an act in the sense of an act for annulment in the sense of Article 263 TFEU 
should take note: Where the CJEU for political reasons wants to decide a case, it finds a 
way to do so! 
  
The second leg of the proportionality review looks at whether the measure under review, 
the OMT programme does not go manifestly beyond what is necessary to achieve the 
objectives it purposes. This level of review is particularly difficult in the event that it is 
not even clear at the time of judicial review if and under which exact conditions that 
measure would be ever implemented. The in-depth discussion of the CJEU of this 
question shows just how far it is willing to go to humour the BVerfG in order to fully 
answer the question posed even in the absence of legally binding detailed information 
about the possible future act. After all, the object of review is not a legal act but an 
announcement at a press conference of the fact that the Governing Board of the ECB 
has decided that in future it may engage in certain activities. One might argue further in 
                               
42 Case C-62/14 Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag (OMT) of 16 June 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, paras 72-80. 
43 Case C-62/14 Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag (OMT) of 16 June 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, para 71. 
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favour of proportionality review of this matter by the CJEU that the announcement of 
the ECB – a factual as opposed to a legally binding act – may have effects on the 
markets through regulation by information and may affect, if implemented, the 
budgetary interests of the shareholders of the ECB which are the National Central 
Banks backed by the Member States. These considerations will have together led the 
CJEU to enter into a more detailed discussion of these matters in this context.   
 
Needless to say, as the CJEU does, that the conditions discussed in the second aspect of 
proportionality here require that the bond purchases by the ECB cease as soon as the 
ECB’s objectives have been achieved.44 However, the determination of this very moment 
is in the ECB’s discretion. This criteria is therefore not a very powerful criteria for 
limitation and judicial review. The Court also points out that at the time of judgement - 
two years after the announcement of the programme - it has not been implemented. The 
announcement as such having been effective to calm the markets therefore seems to 
have been effective and necessary to achieve the objectives of conducting monetary 
policy for the single currency, the Euro. Even if it were implemented, the Court 
continues its analysis of hypotheticals, the announcement contains sufficient limitations 
as to which bonds would be purchased. The selection of bonds only from EFSM and 
ESM ‘programme countries’ would ensure that the bond purchases would not disturb 
the general economic policy objectives of the Union. This selectivity is regarded as part 
of the limitations rendering the measure proportionate and not one of the matters which 
show that the measure is in fact an economic policy measure disguised as monetary 
bond buying programme. In view of the nature of the German concerns, importantly 
the CJEU in para 88 of its judgement states that these limitations of the potential bond 
buying programme would be sufficient. No total cap of money spent on bond buying 
programmes is necessary.  
 
Interestingly, the Court does not apply the usual formula for the second leg of the 
proportionality test, which it uses generally for balancing decisions or limitations of 
rights: For example, in Afton Chemical the Court citing a long line of precedent restates its 
formula that ‘when there is a choice between several appropriate measures recourse 
must be had to the least onerous’. The notion of ‘least onerous’ therefore requires a clear 
definition of the rights in question and of balancing. It would appear that the CJEU 
avoids this formulation in order to avoid accepting that at the end of the day the 
budgetary rights of the Member States are in question. Therefore the CJEU retreats to 
the more general formulation used occasionally in pure ‘limitation of competence’ or 
with other words ‘conferral’ questions and cites instead Association Kokopelli, a case with a 
particularly limited reading of the criteria for review of proportionality, as precedent of 
                               
44 Case C-62/14 Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag (OMT) of 16 June 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, para 82. 
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the formulation of the criteria of proportionality in this case.45 Interstingly, the CJEU 
decides actively to reduce its level of review as compared to the AG who in para 177 of 
his opinion refers to more onerous second-leg proportionality test by looking for 
whether ‘the means used may none the less be excessive if compared with the other 
options that would have been available to the ECB.’46 
 
As a result, the Court finds that since the conditions for the OMT programme include 
strict limitations to objectives pursued and is limited to certain types pf bonds issued by 
Member States selected on the basis of pre-defined criteria the measure is not manifestly 
beyond what is necessary to achieve the ECB’s monetary policy objectives. Limiting the 
proportionality review here, might become the most problematic element of the case, 
and I would predict, would constitute its weakest point. It is a failed opportunity to 
conduct proportionality review to a degree which would even be convincing to the 
openly critical BVerfG.   
 
The third leg of the proportionality test, finally, consists of analysing whether the various 
interests in the case have been overall reasonably weighed up against each other – the so 
called proportionality strictu sensu. On the basis of the above discussions both the CJEU 
and the AG have no difficulties finding that this level of review is complied with. The 
general question to be asked, which underlies the German concerns in the originating 
case is what level of cost the monetary union might be worth to them. That is of course 
a question completely unsuitable for litigation and for a court to decide. Accordingly, the 
discussion is short on this matter.    
 
 
F Conclusion 
 
TO BE DEVELOPED ! 
So, have after all the exceptional emergency acts of the ECB – in this case the OMT 
decision – created through the subsequent judicial review fanything of value for 
concepts of European public law? What can be learnt from the OMT dispute?  
 
I would suggest some first conclusions:  
                               
45 See C-59/11 Association Kokopelli EU:C:2012:447, para 38. Kokopelli concerned a dispute between two seed dealing companies and the 
question whether seeds varieties not officially registered could be marketed. Kokopelli  must be considered particularly narrow since the 
case actually affected rights of individuals which needed to be balanced.  
46 Citing C-331/88  Fédesa and Others EU:C:1990:391 para 13 and C-180/00 Netherlands v Commission EU:C:2005:451, para 103. 
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The legal framework of EU economic policy of the EU is in the process of continuous 
transformation. The economic and financial crisis of the years after 2008 have been 
catalytic for accelerating integration. But some of these measures have gone deeper than 
simply strengthening the previous policy framework and have changed the details of the 
EMU roadmap both from an institutional and constitutional perspective. Monetary 
policy excised in the ESCB’s specific structure of de-centralised Union administration is 
a case study of a highly integrated agency regime which no other EU policy area has 
reached. At the same time, EU monetary policy has become an exemplary field to study 
the independence of agencies, the powerful role which specific expertise is given in 
defining a highly relevant and specifically framed objective: that of guaranteeing price 
stability. This precisely defined policy goal shall be exercised where possible in the 
context of maintaining price stability to contribute to the ‘general economic policies in 
the Union’. It is thus a technical objective which should be exercised also in the context 
of politically defined goals. Therefore, the administration of the Union’s monetary policy 
is highly political administration.  
 
However despite the many specific features, this area also presents itself as an area 
of study with a wealth of examples for many of the general characteristics and the 
problems of the fast evolving Union administrative law.47 One of the reasons for this 
is that normally, monetary and economic policies are quite well hidden away in the 
bowls of the state. Lawyers rarely venture into this field of high technical expertise 
and highly independent agencies. If at all, public law instruments of control of 
central banks are often centred on anticipatory modes of control through 
nomination of key personnel such as the central bank’s president. Ex post tools of 
review and accountability often are in the form of auditing reports and parliament 
hearings in which central bankers need to justify their decisions.  
 
In the EU, this generally well hidden area has been brought to the broad light of day 
by the Treaty of Maastricht and Lisbon’s distribution of powers concerning EMU 
along the various multiple levels of governance. Monetary policy was fully 
centralised in the ECB, economic policy largely remained in the hands of the 
Member States. This distinction proved to be an impossible approach and so since 
2008 in a series of international agreements and EU legislation, economic policy has 
been brought into the realm of the executive branches of Member States 
coordinating on an intergovernmental level and the EU Commission. In view of this, 
the ECB is supposed to exercise its objective of maintaining price stability whilst 
nonetheless supporting the economic policy objectives formulated in within the 
EMU. In doing so, however, it has to navigate the particular, and one might add as 
                               
47 Herwig C.H. Hofmann, Gerard C. Rowe, Alexander H. Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of the European Union, Oxford University Press 
(Oxford 2011), 18. 
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the 2008 crises has shown, quite possibly over-optimistic or even naïve, hope that 
the ‘invisible hand’ of market pressures will lead to a fully-fledged coordination of 
growth oriented economic policies of the Euro Member States. Instead, the ECB 
finds itself in a situation where it has to define monetary policy in view of markets, 
which can over- or under-price certain risks. Speculation is a strong force in creating 
prices. In that situation, the ECB devised its OMT programme in order to 
counteract against speculation detrimental to the existence of a single monetary 
policy.  
 
In view of this, at the end of the day, the dispute before the BVerfG arose from the 
fear that the German Parliament having the ultimate budgetary rights in Germany, 
would be exposed to undefined financial liabilities resulting from ECB action on 
bond markets trying to stem speculation and maintain the unity of the Eurozone. 
The fear was that by buying bonds, the ECB would actually risk bankruptcy itself 
and thus in need of being bailed out by its shareholders – the national central banks. 
Also, the fear was that the ECB would indirectly engage in monetary financing of 
state budgets in that it would buy government bonds by circumventing the 
prohibition of monetary financing of budgets in Article 123(2) TFEU.  
 
The dispute has therefore brought to light a serious design flaw in the EU’s EMU. It 
is difficult to maintain in extreme situations one monetary union in absence of a 
common fiscal and economic policy which would be capable of raising itself enough 
money to back up the ECB’s monetary policy actions. This structure limits both the 
monetary as well as the economic policy options of the EU and the Member States. 
Instead of classic neo-functionalist spill-over, the reality is that the ECB is fighting 
against a speculation based roll-back of integration in a way not un-similar to the 
exchange rate troubles of the early 1990ies which affected both Sweden and the UK. 
 
With respect to the possibilities of judicial review of the actions of central banks, 
Gauweiler marks a big step towards developing accountability in legal terms whilst 
respecting technical expertise and the discretion which has been conferred on the 
ECB in order to back that up. The key instrument in EU law to navigate the 
treacherous waters of ensuring legality and accountability of acts on one hand and 
protecting discretionary power has consisted in fine-tuning the review under 
proportionality. The CJEU takes the right steps to submit ECB action to the 
proportionality test. But much needs to be done to better develop the criteria of 
proportionality whose exact application remains in a state of flux. Just by comparing 
the precedents the CJEU and the AG rely on in definition of their proportionality 
criteria makes clear, how much work needs to be done in this context.  
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Another interesting point which was developed in this case, in response to the 
pressure exercised by the BVerfG, is the possibility of review of what generally 
might be regarded as a ‘factual act’ as opposed to a legally binding act. The 
announcement of a programme which was yet to be defined in legally binding acts 
was submitted to review to answer the question of the BVerfG. The definition of the 
degree of sub-elements of the programme was unclear. Therefore, the Court 
essentially reconfirmed a structure of review for all such not-fully defined types of 
act, be they factual acts, be they programmes of unclear legal status to be later 
specified: The single approach to their review is to control the existence of a legal 
basis, the compliance of the measure with all specifications of the legal basis and, 
finally, a test as to the compliance of the measure with general principles of EU law, 
which in all practical terms often means essentially the compliance with the 
proportionality test.   
 
